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INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
OF FINING INDIGENTS
The practice of sentencing persons to thirty dollars or thirty days has
recently been pushed into judicial antiquity. In Tate v. Short' the United
States Supreme Court ruled that indigents could not constitutionally be
imprisoned for failure to pay a fine.2 However, the discovery of a proper
functional tool of enforcement to replace imprisonment for nonpayment
now faces most courts.
With regard to fines of indigents, fears have long been expressed: "[I]f
no means were provided for enforcing their collection, the sentence to pay
a fine would be, in their ears, but as the tinkling cymbal and the sounding brass." 3 In light of Tate v. Short, some observers have expressed the
opinion that many legislatures and courts may now abrogate fines in traffic
and misdemeanor convictions and routinely impose imprisonment in all
cases. 4 It is the purpose of this commentary to suggest that such a step is

neither necessary nor preferable 5 - that alternative means of
fine are available to protect the state's interest in punishment of
The state of Delaware statutorily abolished imprisonment
ment of fines in 1969 and has arrived at other satisfactory means

collecting a
the offender.
for nonpayof collecting

them. 6 Indeed, unlike several other Supreme Court decisions, which have

forced states to spend money to achieve equal protection of indigent criminal
defendants, 7 the holding of Tate v. Short may enable states to save millions
of dollars a year. 8
PURPOSE AND COST OF IMPRISONMENT

FOR NONPAYMENT

Of the three principal types of noncapital punishment

fine, and probation-

-

imprisonment,

imprisonment is considered to have the greatest deter-

1. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
2.

The Court limited its holding to exclude instances in which a person has the means

to pay a fine but refuses or neglects to do so or in which an indigent is unsuccessful despite
reasonable efforts to satisfy a fine. Id. at 401.

3. State v. Abraham, 139 La. 466, 467, 71 So. 769 (1916).
4. See Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. at 401; St.
Petersburg Times (Fla.), March 4, 1971, §A at 24, cols. 4-6 (Associated Press national survey
of local judges).
5. In Tate, Justice Blackmun implied that prison sentences might not be an "undesirable" method of "resolving the problems of traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways ...." 401 U.S. at 401. This commentary does not discuss
the philosophic merits of imprisonment as a possible proper punishment for an offense,
but deals solely with the situations in which legislatures have allowed and courts have
imposed fines.
6. See text accompanying notes 62-81 infra.
7. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on criminal appeal); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel for criminal defendants); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (transcript for criminal appeal).
8. See text accompanying notes 19-27 infra.
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rent effect because of its severity.9 Courts impose imprisonment in cases where
isolation is required to protect the -community and where discipline and
training in an institutional setting may be conducive to a program of rehabilitation. 0 However, in actual expense to governments and in loss of
productive capacity to the prisoner and support for his dependents, imprisonment is also the most costly alternative.- Further, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice found that
the "atmosphere, associations, and stigma of imprisonment may reinforce...
criminality . .. ,,2 and therefore impede successful reintegration into the
community. Thus, where there is no need for isolation or institutionalized
rehabilitation, a fine is frequently the deterrent applied.?s
A fine has obvious advantages over imprisonment in cases in which it
is determined that less severe punishment is required. A fine may be refunded if error is discovered; paying a fine does not carry the public stigma
of imprisonment or cause separation of families; and a fine is economical
to impose and provide income for the state.-4 The advantage of the penal
fine disappears, however, when a person is without funds to pay a fine and
is imprisoned as a result of that inability.
The person who is imprisoned for nonpayment of fine is separated from
his family,15 and both he and his family suffer the stigma of imprisonment.
The government does not collect the revenue; indeed, it must pay for the
".

9. TnE PRESDENTSS COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
TASK FORCE REPORT: TnE CouRTs 15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FoRCE]. But
authorities acknowledge very little is known about how various kinds of individuals are

JusrICE,

likely to react to correctional programs or about the deterrent effects of the criminal
process. THE PREsIDENr's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
JusTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE Socrry 141

AND

THE ADMINISTRATION

OF

(1967) [hereinafter cited as

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].

10. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 15. Rehabilitation of offenders and deterrence of
potential offenders are, in theory, the goals behind criminal sanctions. Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 n.13 (1948); S.RuBm,THE LAw OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 646, 652-53
(1963) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN]; TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 14. The United States
Supreme Court has said "punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime ....
The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender." Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1948). But correctional institutions have been criticized for
not reaching the goal of rehabilitation. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 159; TIME,
Jan. 18, 1971, at 49.
11. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 15.
12. Id.
13. Rutm, supra note 10, at 265.
14. See E. SuTHERLAND - D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 319-20 (8th ed. 1970).

15. The imprisonment of the head of a household may indirectly have the deleterious
social and economic effect of requiring public welfare payments to support the family of
the imprisoned person. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 15. In California an average of

$16,621,200 is spent 'each year to support the indigent families of persons in jail. CAMFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROGRESS REPORT: DETERRENT Erucr

39 (1968), cited in Note, Fines, Imprisonment and the Poor, 57
L. REv. 778, 789 n.93 (1969).
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
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prisoner's upkeep and possibly the family's subsistence.' 6 Imprisonment may
harden or create antisocial attitudes, and the associations formed while in
jail may increase the possibility of future criminal activity.- Rehabilitation
might be possible under ideal conditions of imprisonment. But sentences
for nonpayment of a fine usually are served in a city or county jail where
rehabilitative facilities and personnel are lacking.1s
No comprehensive statistics are kept in the United States on the cases
in which fines are imposed.' 9 However, some estimates may be made using
20
the results of a special one-day national jail census of city and county jails
and statistics obtained from two states in a survey undertaken by the Uni2
versity of Florida Law Review. 1
16. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 38. "Unnecessary detention costs the community more
than jail expenses. Many persons who fail to raise bail have jobs and dependents. The
consequences of their detention are plain: loss of employment and support for the
family, repossession of household goods, and accumulations of debt. If the family is put
on relief, community funds must be devoted to its support. Loss of employment also
means a drop in the tax revenues; for the employer it may mean the additional expense
of training a replacement." Id. Although this statement referred to indigents held in lieu
of bail, it is equally applicable to those held in lieu of fine.
17. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 29. The sentencing of indigents in lieu of fines is
primarily done by the lower courts, which handle misdemeanors and traffic offenses. This
practice received severe criticism from the staff of the President's Commission on Law

Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. "Two unfortunate characteristics of sentencing practice in many lower courts are the routine imposition of fines on the great majority of misdemeanants . . .and the routine imprisonment of offenders who default in
paying fines. These practices result in unequal punishment of offenders and in needless
imprisonment of many persons because of their financial condition." Id. at 18.

"No program of crime prevention will be effective without a massive overhaul of the lower
criminal courts. The many persons who encounter these courts each year can hardly fail
to interpret that experience as an expression of indifference to their situations and to the
ideals of fairness, equality, and rehabilitation professed in theory, yet frequently denied
in practice. The result may be a hardening of antisocial attitudes in many defendants, and
the creation of obstacles to the successful adjustment of others." Id. at 29.
18. PREsMENr's COMMIssION, supra note 9, at 178. "No part of corrections is weaker
than the local facilities that handle persons awaiting trial and serving short sentences.
Because their inmates do not seem to present a clear danger to society, the response to
their needs has usually been one of indifference." Id.; TIME, Jan. 18, 1971, at 48-49.

19.

3

NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE

AND ENFORCEMENT:

REPORT ON CRIMINAL

STATISTICS 3 (1931) [hereinafter cited as WICKERSIIAM REPORT]; RUBIN, supra note 10,
at 239-40; L. SILVERSrEIN, 1 DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTS, NATIONAL REPORT 123 (1965).

20.

U.S.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

LAW

ENFORCEMENT

ASSISTANCE

ADMINISTRATION,

[LEAA], NATIONAL JAIL CENSUS (1970). The special one-day census of 4,037 city and county
jails was made March 15, 1970, by the Census Bureau on a $140,000 grant from the LEAA.
It showed 160,863 persons being held in those jails. Another 175,317 persons were held
in state prisons at the end of 1967. BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS 8
(1967). Federal prisons held 19,579 inmates. Id. Thus, not counting institutions for juve-

niles, about 355,000 persons are incarcerated e'ach day.
21. The 36 states that have court administrative offices were sent a two-page ques-
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In 1969, 43 per cent of the persons serving post-conviction jail terms in
Arkansas were imprisoned in lieu of payment of fines. 22 In New Jersey 46
per cent of the committed defendants were sentenced for nonpayment. 23
Miami, Florida also has had a 46 per cent ratio of nonpayment sentences
to total commitments. 24 These percentages are similar to others gathered
in prior years. 25 Based on these reports it is apparent that a significant number of prisoners have been held in jail for nonpayment of fines.
Since there were 69,096 prisoners serving sentences in local jails on
the day the national jail census was -taken,26 applying a 40 per cent figure
as a conservative estimate would mean almost 28,000 persons were held that
day for nonpayment of fines. The cost of keeping 28,000 persons in jail
for one day would be as high as 260,000 dollars if the federal prison system's
operation cost of $9.31 a day per prisoner is used. 27 That would mean an
annual cost of about $95 million dollars.

tionnaire. Twenty agencies replied, but only two had statistical information available. Arkansas officials estimated 281,000 persons were fined during 1969 in its municipal courts and 15,000
of them were committed to jail when unable to pay the fines. Another 20,000 were sent to jail
outright. The officials also estimated $525,000 in fines- about 7% of the total assessed - were
not collected because the defendants were indigent. Letter from C. R. Huie, Executive Secretary, Judicial Department, Little Rock, Ark., to University of Florida Law Review, Dec. 2,
1970 [hereinafter referred to as Arkansas letter]. New Jersey reported 11,423 persons were
committed to jail in lieu of fines assessed in municipal courts for traffic, parking and
criminal offenses. Another 13,551 persons were sentenced directly to jail. The amount of
fines assessed totaled $20,138,040. PROCEEDINGS IN THE MUNICIPAL CoumRS, Sept. 1, 1968 to Aug.
31, 1969 (published by Administrative Office of the Courts, Trenton, N.J.) [hereinafter
referred to as NEw JERSEY REPORT].
22. Compiled from statistics in Arkansas letter, supra note 21.
23. Compiled from statistics in Nov JER EY REPORT, supra note 21.
24. The Metropolitan Court of Dade County reported 5,163 persons were committed to
jail in lieu of fines during 1969. Another 6,160 were sentenced to jail terms (some of
these also were fined in addition to the jail term). Mro'OPOLrrAN COURT, DADE COUNTY FLA.,
ANNUAL REPORT (1969).
25. In Baltimore, a ten-month study in 1965 showed 80% of the 20,000 inmates were
there for failure to pay fines. Of 27,000 persons fined in that period, 16,000 were unable to
pay. TAsx FORCE, supra note 9, at 124. A 1910 census showed 58% of all commitments to
prison were for failure to pay fines; by 1923 the percentage had dropped to 47.5%. RUBIN,
supra note 10, at 252. Philadelphia's Reed Street Prison reported that in one year (19491950) 59.9% of the 4,140 commitments were for nonpayment of fines. Note, Fines and Fining
-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1013, 1022 (1953).
26. DEPARThrr oF JusrcE, supra note 20, at 1. Another 83,079 persons held in jail
had not been tried and 8,688 prisoners had been convicted but were awaiting further

legal action. Id. Thus, the total local jail population on March 15, 1970, was 160,863. Id.
27. Letter from Bernard Peters, Public Information Officer, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
to the University of Florida Law Review, Dec. 11, 1970. It is likely the per day cost of
keeping an inmate in a local prison is less than the comparable cost for a federal prison.
In 1968 the per day cost in Florida state prisons was $4.75. FLORIDA PROBATION AND PAROLE
COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1969. Individual Florida cities that responded to a survey estimated per day costs ranging from $3.75 to $8 a day per prisoner.
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Pre-Tate v. Short
Regardless of the economic and social hardships involved in imprisonment for inability to pay a fine, American courts have traditionally upheld
the practice.28- In Griffin v. Illinois, however, the rationale behind nonpayment sentencing began to be eroded. 29 The Supreme Court admonished:
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has." 30 It was not until Williams v. Illinois,31
however, that the Supreme Court had occasion to directly consider the proper
application of the equal protection clause to sentencing for nonpayment
of fine. Williams had been convicted of petty theft and given the maximum
sentence of one year in jail and a 500 dollar fine, which if not paid was to
be satisfied by an additional day in jail for each five dollars still owing.
The state conceded that the only purpose for the nonpayment sentence was
to coerce payment of the fine. 32 The Supreme Court held that an indigent
criminal defendant could not be imprisoned in default of payment of a
fine for a period extending beyond the maximum imprisonment authorized
by the statute regulating the substantive offense. 33 The Court, relying on
Griffin, ruled such a sentence to be an "impermissible discrimination which
iests on ability to pay ....- 34
The equal protection clause has been traditionally construed to require
that distinctions drawn between two classes must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 35 But in cases involving classification
based on race or wealth 36 or matters involving fundamental rights 7 the
Supreme Court has applied a more stringent test for governmental action:
28. See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); United States ex rel. Privitera v.
Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911
(1965); Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1960); United States v. Ridgewood Garment Co., 44 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Peeples v. District of Columbia, 75

A.2d 845 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950); Ex parte Bryant, 24 Fla. 278, 4 So. 854 (1888); Ex
parte Smith, 92 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1939).
29. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 218
N.E.2d 686 (1966).
30. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
31. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
32. Id. at 238. Other states assert the imprisonment serves either as a coercive device
or as substitute punishment for the crime itself. See, e.g., In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473
P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970). The dual purpose view appears to be a legal fiction.
Although the imprisonment is considered punishment rather than merely coercion to pay,
the court in assessing the fine has declared that money rather than imprisonment would
satisfy society's penological interests. See Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 253 N.E.2d
749 (1969).
33. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
34. Id. at 240-41.
35. E.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
36. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

37. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).
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Is the state's purpose "compelling" and is the classification "necessary" to
the purpose?38 In Williams the Court appeared to be applying the compelling and necessary test although it did not use those terms nor did it specifically discuss either standard.
Regardless of which criteria were applied in Williams, the Court limited
its consideration solely to the portion of the sentence served in lieu of fine.
Two classes of defendants were thus contemplated: those who could pay
the fine and those who, like Williams, could not pay and remained in jail
to satisfy the fine.3 9 The state's purpose in the "pay or jail" part of -the sentence was to coerce payment of fines, an interest the Court called "substantial."'40 The remaining question under the traditional equal protection
test would have been whether imprisonment was a rational method of coercing payment.4 1 Without considering that question, however, -the Court discussed the availability of other means of collecting the fine. 42 Thus, the
Court implied that imprisonment was not necessary43 and indicated that the
proper criteria in this area is the more stringent "compelling and necessary"
test.
Williams required only that -the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment
for any substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of
their economic status.44 Consequently, a determination of the equal protection standard applied in that case would be dispositive in concluding
whether the same reasoning would be applicable to a case in which the total
time served did not exceed the statutory maximum. Since imprisonment is
arguably a rational method of coercing payment of a fine, imprisonment
for a period not exceeding the maximum time for the substantive offense might
not be objectionable under the traditional equal protection test. But since
alternative means of payment would be available regardless of whether a
defendant had served the statutory maximum, imprisonment would not be
"compelling and necessary" to coerce payment.- Thus, any imprisonment
for involuntary nonpayment of a fine would fail to meet the more exacting
46
equal protection standard.
38. See Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
39. Williams v. Illinois, 899 US. 235, 236-37 (1970).
40. Id. at 238.
41. The state urged this approach. Id.
42. Id. at 244-45 n.21. The Court listed statutes and articles concerning installment
payment of fines.
43. The Court stated that if there were no other ways to enforce collection of a fine,
allowing an indigent his freedom would amount to inverse discrimination since the person
who had money would have to pay or go to jail while the pauper would escape both.
In other areas of criminal justice, however, the Court has held that states must provide
counsel for indigent defendants, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963), and free
transcripts for appeals by indigents, Draper v. Washington, 872 US. 487 (1963).
44. 899 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
45. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion reached the conclusion that there was
no distinction between imprisonment for a fine alone and imprisonment for nonpayment
when the maximum term also is imposed. 399 U.S. 235, 265 n.* (1970).
46. In another case decided the same day as Williams, four justices adopted the view
that any imprisonment of an indigent for failure to make immediate payment of a fine
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Tate v. Short
Any doubt of the unconstitutionality of sentencing an indigent to jail for
involuntary failure to immediately pay a fine was eliminated in Tate v.
Short.47 The state law in that case only provided for fines in traffic offenses, and
consequently sentencing the defendant to jail in lieu of the fine exceeded
the statutory maximum for the substantive offense. 4s The Court held, however, that the defendant was imprisoned solely because of his indigency. 49
Although the case could have been decided strictly on the basis of Williams,
the Supreme Court adopted the position that all imprisonment for involuntary nonpayment was violative of equal protection.5o
In addition, the Court repeated its statement from Williams that alternative methods of collecting fines may be adopted by the states. 51 The holding does not prevent states from imprisoning a defendant who has the means
to pay a fine but refuses or neglects to do so, or a defendant who despite
52
reasonable efforts is unsuccessful in raising money to pay the fine.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun warned that the decision
"may well encourage state and municipal legislatures to do away with the
fine, and to have the jail term as the only punishment for a broad range
of traffic offenses."53 Whether or not the concern expressed by Justice Blackmun as a result of Tate v. Short proves valid, it is apparent that some sort
of legislative action is necessary in most states.

would be constitutionally defective. Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970). The

four issued a concurring opinion to a per curiam vacation of a lower court judgment on
the grounds of subsequent legislation in the sentencing state. Id. The California supreme
court applied the "compelling and necessary" test a few weeks after Williams, holding imprisonment of a defendant for involuntary nonpayment of a fine was a denial of equal
protection. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970). That case

involved imprisonment for less than the statutory maximum term. The court said alternative methods of collecting the fine would serve both purposes of the state: (1) coercing
payment and (2) rehabilitating the offender by conditions that serve to make him aware

of his responsibility for his criminal conduct. Id. at 115, 473 P.2d at 1008, 89 Cal. Rptr. at

264.
47. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
48. Id. at 396-97.
49. "Imprisonment in such a case is not imposed to further any penal objective of
the State. It is imposed to augment the State's revenues but obviously does not serve that
purpose; the defendant can't pay because he is indigent and his imprisonment, rather than
aid collection of the revenue, saddles the State with the cost of feeding and housing him
for the period of his imprisonment." Id. at 398.
50. Id. at 399.
51. Id. at 399-400.
52. Id. at 400-01. The Tate decision would have appeared to cover persons in the
latter category had the court not specifically separated them. However, the court did not
approve of jail in lieu of fine for persons who are unable to satisfy the fine despite reason-

able efforts, it merely withheld a decision until such a case comes before it. Id.
53.

Id. at 401.
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The federal government 54 and all of the states except Delaware have
statutes allowing imprisonment for nonpayment. 55 The statutes vary considerably in their attempts to coerce payment of the fine.4e As noted by the Su-

54. 18 US.C. §3565 (1964).
55. ALA. CODE tit. 15, §341

(1958); ALAsKA STAT. §§12.55.010,

.030 (1962)

($5 a day,

release after 30 days on certain conditions); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-1648 (1956) ($1 a
day up to statutory maximum); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§43-2315, 46-510 (1964) ($1); CAL. PENAL
CODE §1205 (1968) ($2 a day up to statutory maximum); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§39-10-10,

-10-9 (1963) (pauper's discharge); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§18-63, -50, 54-119 (1968) ($3);
FLA. STAT. §§775.07, 921.14, 951.15 (1969) (30 cents, 60 days); GA. CODE ANN. §27-2901 (Supp.
1969); HAwAu REv. LAws §712-4 (1968) (pauper's discharge); IDAHo CODE ANN. §19-2517
(Supp. 1969) ($5); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §1-7(k) (Supp. 1971), §180.6 (1964) ($5, 6 months,
pauper's discharge); IND. ANN. STAT. §§9-2228, -2227a (Supp. 1969) ($5); IowA CODE ANN.
§§762.32, 789.17 (1950)

($3.33); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§62-1518, -1515, -2109 (1964) ($2,

pauper's discharge); Ky. REv. STAT. §431.140 (1969) ($2); LA. CODE Cum. PRo. ANN. art.
884 (West Supp. 1970) (1 year maximum); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1904 (Supp. 1970)
($5, 11 months); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, §4 (Supp. 1970) ($10); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 279,
§1.145, ch. 127, §§144-45 (1969) ($1, pauper's discharge); Mica. COm p. LAws ANN.
§769.3 (1968) (30 days); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§629.53, 641.10 (Supp. 1969) ($3); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§7899, 7906 (1957) ($3, 2 years); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§546.830, .840, 551.010, 543.260, .270
(1953) ($2); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §95-3202(b) (1969) ($10); NEB. Rrv. STAT. §§29-2206,
-2412, -2404 (1965) ($6); NEV. REv. STAT. §176.065 (1967) ($4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§618.6, .9 (Supp. 1969) ($5); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§2A:16614, -15, -16, 2A:169-1 (Supp.
1969) ($5); N.M. STAT. ANN. §42-1-60 (1964), §42-2-9 (Supp. 1971) ($5, pauper's discharge);
N.Y. CODE CRIM.

PROC. §470-3

(Supp. 1970);

N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§§6-65,

23-23,

23-24

(Supp. 1970) (pauper's discharge); N.M. CENT. CODE §29-26-21 (1960) ($2); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. §§2947.14, .20 (Baldwin 1964) ($3); OKRA. STAT. tit. II, §794, tit. 57, §15 (1969) ($2,
pauper's discharge); ORE. REv. STAT. §§137.150, 169.160 (1967) ($5, pauper's discharge);
PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 12, §257, tit. 39, §323, tit. 19, §§953, 956 (1964) (pauper's discharge);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §13-2-36 (1957) ($5); S.C. CODE ANN. §§17-574 to 55-593 (1962); S.D.
COm1m'En LAws ANN. §23-48-23 (1960) ($2); TENN. CODE ANN. §40-3202 (1955), §41-1223
(Supp. 1970) ($5); Tax. CODE CRim. PROC. art. 43.09 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-15
(1953) ($2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§7221-23 (Supp. 1971) ($1); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§10.82.030 (Supp. 1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§62-4-9, -10 (1966) ($1.50, 6 months); Wis. STAT.
§§959.055, 957.04 (Supp. 1969) (6 months); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§6-8, 7-230 (1969) ($1).
56. Many state statutes have provided a specified minimum per day rate at which
credit is to be given toward satisfying the fine. This rate varies from 30 cents to $10, but
generally is between $1 and $5. Ironically, most of the rates are below the per day cost
to the state of keeping a person in jail. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
The equal protection clause has been invoked in two cases to throw out low per day credits
against assessed fines. In Strattman v. Studt the Ohio supreme court found a $8 per day
credit was "so unreasonable that it unfairly discriminates against the indigent." 20 Ohio
St. 2d 95, 102, 253 N.E.2d 749, 753 (1969). A New York court similarly voided a 150-day
sentence in lieu of a $150 fine. People v. McMillan, 53 Misc. 2d 685, 279 N.Y.S.2d 941
(Orange County Ct. 1967). Some states allow short delays of sentence to enable the defendAN.

ant to raise the fine. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §10.82.030

(Supp. 1969) (5 days);

Wis. STAT. ANN. §959.055 (Supp. 1969) (30 days). Other states have a
of time that can be imposed for nonpayment. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRm.
(West Supp. 1970) (1 year). Still others allow an indigent to obtain
specified time by signing a "pauper's oath," a statement that he has no

maximum amount
PRO. ANN. art. 884
his release after a
money or property

over a minimal value. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §39-19-10 (1964).
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preme Court in both Williams v. Illinois- and Tate v. Short,58 a few states
have allowed judges to accept installment payments. The state statutes mentioned by the Court59 do not require a judge to accept installment payments,
however, nor do they forbid him from jailing a person who is unable to
pay. 60 Two states, New York and Maryland, recently enacted laws limiting
the use of nonpayment imprisonment, but neither prohibited sentences for
nonpayment. 61 Thus, all of these laws would appear to allow the sentences
that the Supreme Court has forbidden. Only Delaware appears to have a
law completely in accord with the constitutional demands of Tate v. Short.
The Delaware Experience
In 1969 Delaware, at the request of its Governor, abolished the practice
63
62
of imprisoning persons unable to pay fines. The legislature enacted a law
that provided: "No person sentenced to pay fine or costs upon conviction of
a crime shall be ordered imprisoned in default of the payment of such fine
or costs." 64 Various sections of the bill allowed a person who was fined to
pay at designated intervals, to execute a judgment bond for payment within -ten days, or to agree to report to the commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction to be assigned employment in public works
65
projects at the normal salary until the fine was paid.

57. 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
58. 401 U.S. 395, 400 n.5 (1971).
59. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §1205 (West 1970). This is the statute under which the
petitioner in In re Antazo received the imprisonment for nonpayment that the California
supreme court held unconstitutional. See note 46 supra.
60. Dramatic evidence that merely allowing courts to use installments does not greatly
reduce nonpayment sentencing comes from Great Britain. Courts were allowed to accept
installment payments in 1879. Craven, Criminal Justice in England, 27 CAN. B. Rxv. 1111,
1113-14 (1949). But annual imprisonments for nonpayment totaled 79,583 in 1913. A
1914 act required giving a defendant time to pay in most circumstances, and cases of
nonpayment imprisonment declined to 15,261 in 1923. Id. A 1935 act proscribed immediate
imprisonment for nonpayment and required the judge to take a defendant's financial condition into consideration. Imprisonment for nonpayment continued to fall from 12,496
in 1930 to 7,936 in 1938. Id. at 1114.
61. See note 81 infra.
62. Wilmington (Del.) Evening Journal, June 16, 1969, at 1, col. 3, at 2, cols. 4-6. The
Governor of Delaware, Russell W. Peterson, had a background in correction law reform
as chairman of a citizens' group that obtained revision of the state's correctional system in
1964. A HisroRY OF THE THRE-S-CrrizENs' CAMPAIGN (1964).
63. DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§4103, 4106 (1969).
64. Id. §4106 (a). Economic reasons appeared to provide the main motivation. The state
correction commissioner, Warren J. Gehrt, said about one-third of the state prison inmates
at the time were held for nonpayment, and it was costing $6.28 a day to hold each prisoner.
Wilmington (Del.) Evening Journal, June 16, 1969, at 1, col. 3. A former magistrate, S.
Bernard Ableman, said at the time: "What we have now is a situation where the judge
says, 'Since you can't pay your fine, I now sentence the taxpayer to $6.28 a day for X
number of days in default of your fine."' Id. at 4, cols. 5-6.
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, §4106(b) (1969). Another section permitted the magistrate
court to order a defendant to pay the victim for physical or property damage. Id. §4103.
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The first year of operation under the new law was not without problems.
The amount of unpaid fines nearly doublede- and some law enforcement officials complained that minor offenders were making a mockery of the police
and courts.6 7 These problems, however, were blamed primarily on the failure
to provide the courts with adequate power to enforce deferred payments. 6
Even with the problems of enforcement, state officials claimed a net savings to
the state over the previous year because of a large decrease of prison expenses 6 9
One year after the original law was adopted, a series of five amendments
were enacted to alleviate deficiencies in the original statute.7 0 The amendments make it easier for courts -to enforce payments by granting magistrate
courts the power of civil contempt,- the authority to request suspension
of driver's -licenses,72 and the authority to garnish wages.7 3 In addition to these
statutory powers, uniform procedures have been established in the magistrate
courts to insure prompt efforts to collect the fine when a defendant defaults
4
on the installments.7
Fines assessed but not collected rose from seven per cent of total fines
in the year before the enactment of the law to eleven per cent in the year
afterward.-M State officials have begun to reduce defaults sharply. Unpaid
money is still being collected76 and since the institution of uniform pro-

This reparation section has been repealed by 57 Laws of Del., ch. 513 (1970). Commentators
generally have urged a reparation program, however. See generally Note, But What About
the Victim? The Forsaken Man in American Criminal Law, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1969).
66. Report submitted by Joseph B. Leavy to Governor Peterson, July 9, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Leavy Report].
67. Wilmington (Del.) Evening Journal, Aug. 19, 1969, at 1, cols. 1-3.
68. Letter from Harold T. Perkins, Justice of the Peace and Chief Judge for New
Castle County, Delaware, to the University of Florida Law Review, Dec. 6, 1970.
69. Leavy Report, supra note 66. The net savings to the state at that point was $5,161.
However, amounts later collected on fines owed by persons released under the law would
increase the net savings.
70. Wilmington (Del.) Evening Journal, April 8, 1970, at 11, cols. 4-7.
71. DEL. COD ANN. tit. 10, §9506 (Supp. 1971).
72. Id. tit. 21, §§2731, 2732 (Supp. 1971).
73. Id. tit. 10, §4913 (Supp. 1971).
74. Directive 72 from the Deputy Administrator to the Chief Justice of the State of Delaware, Oct. 28, 1970, and Directive 72A, Nov. 27, 1970. The administrator of the justice of the
peace system hopes to further stiffen the law by obtaining passage of a bill requiring persons
signing for installment payments to surrender their driver's licenses at that time. Temporary permits would be issued for the period until full payment was due. Letter from Morton
Richard Kimmel, Deputy Administrator to the Chief Justice of the State of Delaware, to the
University of FloridaLaw Review, Jan. 13, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Kimmel Letter]. Issuance
of the temporary license would remove some of the inconvenience required by the system
currently used.
75. Compiled from figures in the Leavy Report, supra note 66.
76. Since the defendants have not been held in jail the fine has not been extinguished.
There is no time limit on collection of such judgments. Smith v. United States, 143 F.2d
228 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 323 U.S. 729 (1944). Mr. Kimmel believes less than 7% of the
money still owed will prove to be uncollectable. Kimmel Letter, supra note 74. That
would mean the state would end up collecting about 98% of all fines assessed, based on
figures in the Leavy Report, supra note 66.
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cedures the collection rate has increased thirty-five per cent. 7 Over-all, the
state expects to save several hundred thousand dollars a year over the old
system of collection by imprisonment7 8
Delaware officials believe the Tate v. Short decision will help in their
efforts to collect from out-of-state residents.79 Although the state can cancel an out-of-state resident's driving privilege in Delaware and request the
home state to supend the person's license, other states have not cooperated.80
The Supreme Court decision could lead to reciprocity agreements if other
states adopt similar installment payments systems.81

77. Statement of Governor Russell W. Peterson, March 8, 1971 [hereinafter cited as
the Governor's Statement].
78. In the fiscal year prior to enactment of the no-imprisonment law, Delaware jailed
2,123 persons for failure to pay fines. They served an average of 15.8 days in prison and
cost the state about $230,000 for upkeep. Id. In addition, about $100,000 in fines went
uncollected. Leavy Report, supra note 66. Some of the savings will be offset by the hiring
of additional court clerks to handle the administrative matters. Statement of Mr. Morton
Richard Kimmel, Deputy Administrator to the Chief Justice of the State of Delaware, March
8, 1971 [hereinafter cited as the Kimmel Statement].
79. Kimmel Statement, supra note 78; Governor's Statement, supra note 77.
80. Id. Magistrates had found the majority of out-of-state residents willingly pay installments, perhaps in appreciation of the state's treatment of them. Letters from Justice
of the Peace Noble S. Warren, Nov. 1970, and Justice of the Peace Norman D. Baker, Nov.
19, 1970 to the University of Florida Law Review.
81. Two other states, Maryland and New York, have in recent years updated their
laws on sentencing in lieu of fine. In Maryland the law was passed after a federal district
court required courts to grant a hearing to indigents before imprisoning them for nonpayment. Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md.), vacated and remanded, 399 U.S.
508 (1969). The Maryland law does not bar imprisonment for nonpayment, but merely
requires that a defendant be given an opportunity to inform the court of his inability to
pay the fine. The judge then may allow installment payment, reduce the fine to an amount
the defendant is able to pay, or order the defendant committed for nonpayment. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 38, §§l, 4 (Supp. 1970). The latter alternative thus allows what Tate v. Short
forbids.
In New York the statute also followed a court opinion that held a sentence under the
prior law to be unconstitutional. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271
N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966). The opinion in Saffore was restricted to the portion of the sentence
in the lieu of fine, which resulted in imprisonment in excess of the maximum penalty
provided by statute for the substantive offense. The new law greatly discourages nonpayment sentencing, but does not expressly forbid it. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §470-d (Supp. 1970),

repealing N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §718 (1958). However, §470-d has been replaced itself
by the new Criminal Procedure Law §420.10, which took effect Sept. 1, 1971, and is substantially the same in content. The statute allows installment payments. If the court is

satisfied the defendant is unable to pay, a new sentence must be imposed based on the
amount defendant can pay. A defendant unable to pay may apply for resentencing at any
time.
The American Bar Association, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§2.7, 6.5 (Approved Draft 1968), and the American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE §§7.02, 302.1-3
(Proposed Official Draft 1962), have each proposed model codes that would greatly change
prevailing practice
MODEL PENAL CODE
standards proposed
of payment of fine

in assessment of fines and imprisonment for nonpayment. The ALI
would appear to meet the requirements of Tate v. Short. However, the
by the ABA would still leave the alternative of imprisonment in lieu
within the trial judge's discretion and would, therefore, appear to be
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THE PRACIcE IN FLORIDA

Under Florida law, whenever a court assesses a fine it must also set an
alternate period of imprisonment.8 2 No statutory provision is made for installment payment of fines. Indeed, installment payment may be prohibited
because it is provided by law that if the fine is not paid within twenty-four
hours (during which the person remains in custody), the defendant "shall"
be committed to the county jail "until such fines and costs shall be paid
or until duly discharged by law."8 3 The mandatory wording of the statute
would not seem to allow for release without payment.
In some instances, however, Florida courts have avoided imprisonment
for nonpayment of fines. 84 In Dade County Metropolitan Court, for example,

unacceptable in that respect. ABA SETENCING ALTERNATI ES AND PRocEmuRs §2.7(b) (Approved Draft 1968).
82. F A.STAT. §921.14 (1969).
83. Id. §937.11 (2). The prisoner is entitled to a credit of at least 30 cents a day toward
his fine and costs. Id. §951.15. The prison indigent who has been sentenced in lieu of fine
has three potential avenues for relief:
(1) He miy be released on a 90-day bond for the amount of the fine and costs if he
can find "one or more good and responsible persons" willing to sign such bond. Id.
§921.15 (1). This practice apparently is infrequently followed. Letter from Monroe W.
Treiman, County Judge, Hernando County, Florida, and Executive Secretary, Florida
County Judges Association, to the University of Florida Law Review, Oct. 26, 1970.
(2) For misdemeanors where the substantive statute does not specify the punishment,
a general statute provides a maximum sentence of $200 or 90 days in jail; if a fine alone
is authorized by the substantive statute, a court may order the defendant imprisoned
for 60 days in default of payment. FLA. STAT. §775.07 (1969).
(3)A person who has been sentenced to a fine not over $300, confined in prison for
60 days, and who does not have property valued at over $20 may apply to the court
for discharge from custody. Id. §922.04. One other possible benefit provided by Florida
law to the indigent defendant is the opportunity to be heard on mitigating circumstances
before imposition of the sentence. However, the judge is not required to ask if there are
any such circumstances. Id. §921.13. Indigent defendants may also be discharged from payment of costs. Id. §939.05.
84. Statistics showing the dimensions of the practice of imprisonment in Florida for
nonpayment of a fine are not generally available. A questionnaire seeking statistical information on the number of prisoners jailed through alternate sentences was mailed to the
sheriffs and police chiefs in 11 of the 12 largest cities and counties in Florida. In addition,
officials in the Alachua County sheriff's office and Gainesville police department were
interviewed. Of the 22 questionnaires mailed, 10 were returned, but accurate information
was unavailable. Estimates of the number of prisoners held on alternate sentence ran
from 1% to 84%. One reason statistics are not compiled appears to be that if a person
cannot pay a fine immediately in a municipal or county judge's court, he is turned over
to the city police department or sheriff's office. If relatives then pay the fine, he is released,
but the court is not notified. There is no cross-checking of information between the
judicial and police agencies. Nor, apparently, in most cases do either the courts or police
compile any annual breakdown of information showing number of alternate sentences, the
amount of fines assessed but not collected, or numbers of prisoners serving alternate sentences. The Dade County Metropolitan Court, which uses a computer in its recordkeeping,
published an annual report for 1969 that shows that 137,202 persons paid fines; that 5,163
individuals were fined and jailed when unable to pay; that 3,292 persons were sentenced
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the presiding judge may authorize a stay of execution of a fine; nonetheless,
5,163 persons went to jail for nonpayment in 1969.85 In Tampa, Florida,
a probation officer is available in court to arrange for delayed payments
by persons who cannot immediately pay a fine. S6
In Hernando County, Florida, the county court has developed a system
of installment payments. 7 After a defendant has either pled or been found
guilty, the court will withhold sentence and release the defendant on his
own recognizance. The defendant then makes periodic payments to a trust
fund; when the fund equals the fine and costs the defendant is sentenced
88
and the money transferred to the court's fine account.
In addition to these individual and random indications of dissatisfaction with the alternate sentencing system in Florida, a committee established by the Florida Bar has made recommendations to end the practice
of alternate sentencing.89 The committee's recommendations, based on a
comparison of Florida law with the ABA minimum standards, include sug-

directly to jail; and that 2,868 defendants received both a jail sentence and fine. The
report does not show the total amount of the fines assessed against those who could not
pay. METROPOLITAN COURT, DADE COUNTY, FLA., ANNUAL REPORT (1969).
A possible indication that Florida has a large number of persons sentenced in lieu of
payment of fines comes from these statistics: Florida ranks ninth in population. US.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

is fifth in serious crimes. U.S. DEPARTMENT

12 (91st ed. 1970). It

OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 64-73

(1969).

It is fifth in state prison population. BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS 8
(1967). It is third in the number of prisoners serving sentences in city and county jails.
U.S.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,

LAw

ENFORCEMENT

ASSISTANCE

ADMINISTRATION,

NATIONAL

JAIL CENSUS 9 (1970). If 40% of the 4,011 prisoners in city, and county jails on one day
(id.) were there for nonpayment, the cost per year in jail expenses for those held for nonpayment would be about $2,800,000. This computation is arrived at by using the Florida
Probation and Parole Commission's estimate of the cost of providing for care of a prisoner
in a state prison at $4.75 a day. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
85. METROPOLITAN COURT, DADE COUNTY, FLA., ANNUAL REPORT (1969). The Miami
court system has one of the most liberal "work off" rates in the nation, reducing the fine
by $15 for each day served. Id.
86. Letter from Norman Conaty, Assistant Superintendent, City of Tampa Sanitation
Department, to the University of Florida Law Review, Dec. 29, 1970.
87. Letter from Monroe W. Treiman, County Judge, Hernando County, Florida, and
Executive Secretary, Florida County Judges Association, to the University of Florida Law
Review, Nov. 3, 1970.
88. Id. The system is not available to defendants from out of the area or those with
whom there has been "bad experience" in the past. Id. A defendant can have the payment
schedule extended for good cause. But if the defendant does not cooperate, the judge
may issue a capias for his arrest. Id. Another effort at freeing indigent defendants pending
payment of fines has been made in Pensacola. A police inspector assumed the responsibility
over an 18-month period of releasing about 100 prisoners who owed fines from $10 to $311,
allowing them to find work and then pay the fine. Letter from Inspector James C. Davis,
Commanding Officer of the Service Division, Pensacola Police Department, to the University
of FloridaLaw Review, Dec. 3, 1970.
89.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

OF NINE APPRovED ABA STANDARDS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATION

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE wrrn FLORIDA STATUTORY LAW, COURT RULES AND LEGAL PRACTICE 86

(1970). The committee merely compared Florida's statutes to the ABA standards and did
not conduct an independent examination into the matter.
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gested statutory provision for allowing installment sentences, legislative
criteria as to whether a fine is the proper punishment for an offense, and
abolition of the alternate sentence system. 90
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has ruled that states may no longer impose imprisonment for inability to immediately pay a fine.91 The decision leaves state
legislatures and courts the choice of alternative means of enforcing their
penological interests. Some observers believe the result will be increased
use of jail terms and less use of fines.92 Unless the authorities decide, however, that imprisonment is a necessary or preferable deterrent in traffic and
minor misdemeanor cases such a step would appear to be unjustified. Although
increased use of specified jail terms might withstand equal protection challenges, 93 that alternative poses obvious unacceptable social consequences. 4 In
addition, any saved administrative costs through imprisonment rather than
installment payment would probably be illusory.9 5
Imprisonment often results in loss of employment and the resulting social
and economic problems inherent in separation of families. Unless adequate
rehabilitative facilities are provided, imprisonment may well harden the
individual's anti-social attitude rather than ameliorate his criminal predilections. Especially in the cases of misdemeanors and minor first offenses
does the social and economic cost of imprisonment appear anomalous.
Although an initial reaction to Tate v. Short is that it presents another
step toward favoring the lawbreaker at the expense of the state, in reality it
may provide states the impetus to enforce their laws at less cost to government and society. Given the present plight of our national prison systems
and the social problems created by the disparity in imprisoning the poor
while the more affluent guilty go free, the decision in Tate v. Short may
prompt changes in our penal system that have been long needed. The Delaware experience has shown that the practices proscribed by Tate v. Short
were, indeed, antiquated. florida must make an immediate reassessment of its
methods of enforcing fines if it is to conform to constitutional mandates
and provide a more just and economical penal system.
THOMAS E.

MoRIus

90. Id. at 86-87. It is obvious that present Florida statutory provisions are unsatisfactory and fall dearly within the proscriptions of Tate v. Short.

91.
92.
93.
persons
94.
95.

Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
Equal protection might still be argued if it could be shown that courts were fining
from higher economic classes and imprisoning those from lower economic classes.
See text accompanying notes 9-18 supra.
See text accompanying notes 62-78 supra.
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